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Abstract 
The present research looks into relations between institutional 
environment and institutional arrangements and builds a more complex view on 
the entry mode choice. Specifically, it investigated the entry mode choices in oil 
and gas exploration and development activities. The probabilities of the exact 
operation and investment methods occurrence depending on the host-country 
regulatory environment factors are estimated. The research results into the 
development of the two-dimensional framework of the entry-mode choice which 
characterizes the entry mode as two simultaneous choice (operational and 
investment) and evaluates their dependency on the host-country regulatory 
environment. The study uses the unique and detail dataset from Scandinavian oil 
and gas companies that work with exploration and development. The analysis 
shows that companies tend to establish new wholly-owned entities in countries 
with expensive contract enforcement and simple taxation and the partial 
acquisition modes in the countries with opposite characteristics. The two other 
alternatives lie in-between with relation to the regulatory environment 
characteristics. 
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1. Introduction 
 The choice of a market entry mode is thought to be one of the most 
important questions in international business (Morschett, Schramm-Klein, and 
Swoboda 2010). Furthermore, companies’ choices of foreign operation modes 
have been a central theme of international business studies from the very 
beginning (Hymer 1960 [1976]). According to Werner (2002), entry modes are on 
the third place among the most researched fields in international management.  
 Through the history different economic theories and approaches have 
presented their views on the entry mode issue:  
- the economics based approaches of internalization and transaction cost 
theories (Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Buckley and Casson 1976; Hennart 1982, 
Madhok 1998; Brouthers and Nakos 2004), 
- evolutionary and resource based approaches (Andersen 1997; Kogut and 
Zander 1998; Mutinelli and Piscitello 1998; Sharma and Eramilli 2004),  
- institutional approaches (Meyer and Peng 2005; Brouthers 2002),  
- process models based on learning and decision behavior theories 
(Johanson and Vahlne 1977, 2009).  
 An entry mode itself can be defined as “a structural agreement that allows 
a firm to implement its product market strategy in a host country either by 
carrying out only the marketing operations (i.e., via export modes), or both 
production and marketing operations there by itself or in partnership with others 
(contractual modes, joint ventures, wholly owned operations)” (Sharma and 
Erramilli 2004, 2). 
One of the explanations for the entry mode choice which exists in the 
literature is based on the conditions of the host-country institutional environment. 
Researchers (Gomes-Casseres 1990; Henisz 2000; Brouthers 2002; Grewal and 
Dharwadkar 2002; Meyer et al. 2009; Kshetri and Dholakia 2011; Svendsen and 
Haugland 2011) have intensively discussed the influence of the institutional 
environment on the choice of entry mode. Despite the large amount of research 
conducted within the field of foreign operation methods using different 
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perspectives and approaches, it is still hard to answer the question of why 
companies choose particular entry modes in different institutional contexts.  
Osland, Taylor, and Zou (2001) argue that the entry mode decision is 
highly complex, since many different factors (both target market factors and 
within-company factors) affect it. It seems that there is no ideal entry mode, 
because different companies often apply different entry strategies in the same 
market basing on different arguments and considering different sets of factors. 
Because of foreign operations complexity within regions, countries, industries, 
and even each particular company, it often seems that theory does not match 
business reality. Not surprisingly Grewal and Dharwadkar (2002) see the 
development of measures for assessing the extent of the various institutional 
mechanisms’ influence among the most important research challenges.  
 When it comes to research on the host-country regulatory environment’s 
influence on the entry mode choice, the restrictions on foreign ownership are the 
most commonly studied factor and conclusions about their influence are 
substantial (Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Gomes-Casseres 1990; Brouthers 
2002; Morschet, Schram-Klein, and Swoboda 2010). However, such regulatory 
institutional factors as contract enforcement and investor protection have gained 
relatively little attention with regard to the entry mode choice (Brouthers and 
Nakos 2004; Neto, Brandão, and Cerqueira 2008; Zhou and Poppo 2010) even 
though they are thought to be among the most important host-country 
characteristics (Brouthers and Nakos 2004; Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992; Neto, 
Brandão, and Cerqueira 2008). Also, the taxation system’s influence on the entry 
mode has not been studied enough (Hebous, Ruf, and Waichenrieder 2010; 
Becker and Fuest 2011) to provide any strong evidence about it. 
 The important characteristic of the existing literature is its discrete choice 
approach. In majority of cases the studies focus only on wholly-owned subsidiary 
vs. joint-venture (Benito 1996; Brouthers 2002) or equity-based vs. contractual 
entry modes choices (Anderson and Coughlan 1987) on the one side and 
greenfield vs. acquisition (Slangen and Hennart 2007; Becker and Fuest 2011) on 
the other side. Companies are assumed to choose among few alternatives which 
usually distinguish possible choices only from one perspective. Thus, existing 
research lacks more general discussion.  
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 Some researchers (Clark, Pugh, and Mallory 1997; Petersen and Welch 
2002; Benito, Petersen, and Welch 2009; Benito, Petersen, and Welch 2011) 
propose that the reality is much more complex and companies may use different 
modes at the same time, and even concurrently for the same type of activity in a 
given location. However, this is just one side of the coin, while another can 
describe the entry mode not as a one-dimensional choice, but as a complex multi-
dimensional problem. Entry mode decision is not only about operation method 
(export, contract, JV, WOS), but also about investment (greenfield or M&A), 
financing (debt or equity) and other decisions, taken simultaneously. 
 The present research looks into relations between institutional 
environment and institutional arrangements, namely regulatory environment and 
modes of foreign entry, and tries to fill in the gaps left in previous studies. The 
purpose of this study is to build a complex view on the entry mode choice. In line 
with Dikova and Witteloostuijn (2007) it looks into two dimensions of the entry 
mode choice. Precisely, it aims to evaluate the probability of the specific 
operation and investment methods’ occurrences depending on the specific host-
country regulatory environment factors (i.e., contract enforcement, investor 
protection, and taxation).  
 The results from such research contribute with new findings about 
institutional environment influence on institutional arrangements in international 
business. It provides better understanding of how such regulatory institutional 
environment elements as contract enforceability, investor protection, and taxation 
influence the entry modes decisions. It also highlights the regulatory environment 
elements the managers should pay attention to while entering new market. 
Furthermore, since it looks into one particular type of activity – oil and gas 
exploration and development, it allows building important empirical evidence and 
implications for companies working in this sector. At the same time, it might 
provide recommendations about the most suitable and efficient entry mode within 
various institutional environments. 
 Overall, the research aims to answer the question: 
How do such regulatory institutional environment factors as contract 
enforceability, investor protection, and taxation influence the 2 dimensions of 
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the entry mode choice in the oil and gas exploration and development sector: 
operation method (choice of wholly-owned subsidiary vs. joint-venture) and 
investment method (choice of greenfield investment vs. acquisition)?  
 To answer the research question, the existing literature is reviewed 
including relevant studies as a basis for hypotheses development. Then the model 
is built and estimated. The study concludes with theoretical and managerial 
implications as well as propositions for further research.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Industry Overview  
Oil and gas industry includes different types of business activities: 
exploration and development, production and storage, transportation and sales, 
technology development etc. As any other industry, it also has some specific 
characteristics, especially when it comes to contract types. They are important for 
understanding how companies operate and, furthermore, how they enter into 
foreign markets.  
Each oil/gas field is usually developed as a separate project. If more than 
one company is involved, normally the exploration/development consortium is 
established. Also, if there is only one company, it often tends to own a subsidiary 
that operates the project (especially if this is its only project in a specific country). 
2.1.1. Licensing 
Oil and gas industry is highly regulated. So, the first and probably the 
most important distinction of this industry is governmental licensing. A license 
can belong to a single company or to several companies at the same time, it can 
cover one or more blocks (mainly offshore), but legally it is only one license (UK 
Government Department of Energy and Climate Change 2012). 
Licenses are awarded by the government or specially designed authorities 
in each country through licensing rounds. They are valid for a specified 
period/term which is normally equal to the typical stage of the field life cycle (UK 
Government Department of Energy and Climate Change 2012). Usually, the 
initial term is an exploration period, the second one is considered for appraisal and 
development, and the last one is applied for production. Each license expires at 
the end of the term if licensee has not progressed enough to warrant a chance to 
move further. The qualification criteria for licensee to continue in the next term 
depend on the minimum progress that licensee must assure, but the maximum 
limit is not set. 
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2.1.2. Farm-in and Farm-out Agreements 
Another important distinction of oil and gas industry is farm-in and farm-
out agreements.  
According to Akinjide (2010) farm-ins include deals that allow an oil 
company not possessing a license in a particular area to obtain an interest from 
one of the existing licensees. Handovers of interest are made assuming certain 
commitments, such as exploration, exchanges of license interests or cash. 
2b1consulting states that “Farm-in-Agreement is a contract signed between two 
companies, the Farmor and the Farmee, where the Farmor is the owner of the 
acreage and the Farmee is willing to perform the drilling and exploration in the 
acreage of the Farmor” (2b1stconsulting 2012). The main reason for a farm-in 
agreement is sharing costs and risks of drilling as well as increasing capital 
expenditures while expecting higher gain in return. It can be due to the need of 
more technologies, rumors about the higher reserves than expected etc. Usually, 
cash and technology provided by a farmee helps to speed up the development of 
the field.  
Generally, the reasons for farm-in and farm-out have the opposite nature. 
So, when for one company it is a farm-in, for another one it can be a farm-out.  
Daintith and Willoughby (1984) define a farm-out as “an agreement 
whereby a third party agrees to acquire from one or more of the existing licensees 
an interest in a production license, and in the operating agreement relating to it, 
for a consideration which, in oil industry practice, will normally consist of the 
carrying out of a specified work obligation, known as the earning in obligation, 
used in the drilling of one or more wells” (Akinjide 2010).  
A farming-out agreement appears when the farmor is unable to develop the 
field before the license expires or because of budgeting constraints. In order not to 
lose the license, the owner (farmor) finds another company to farm into the 
drilling operations. In such a case, farmor accepts a lower interest, but reduces 
risks and improves financial performance (2b1stconsulting 2012). 
Importantly, if a specific consortium, JV, or WOS that owns the license 
exists, the license interests can be bought and sold through usual share acquisition 
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agreements. Furthermore, the acquisition of assets is also possible in oil and gas 
industry.  
2.1.3. Production Sharing Agreements/Contracts  
The last but not least specific characteristic of the oil and gas industry is a 
production sharing agreement (PSA). This is a contract signed between a 
government representative and a (foreign) oil and gas company (Bindemann 
1999). It can be a JV or a consortium instead of a single company, but the number 
of companies involved does not affect the contract structure and are normally 
treated as one party. Production sharing agreements concern the options for the 
government to participate in the field development and specify the royalty form 
and amount that should be paid by the company to the government when the 
oil/gas is produced.  
2.2. Entry Modes 
2.2.1. Entry Modes Types 
 Anderson and Gatignon (1986, 1) state that “the most appropriate (most 
efficient) entry-mode is a function of the tradeoff between control and the cost of 
resource commitment”. They propose that the greater combination of country risk 
and transaction-specificity of assets, the higher degree of control should be 
applied while choosing the entry mode. 
 There is a wide variety of international business arrangements 
classifications. Usually, modes of entry are classified based on the degree of 
control they imply: (1) wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS), (2) joint-venture (JV), 
(3) contractual entry modes (licensing, franchising etc.), and (4) exporting 
(Welch, Benito, and Petersen 2007). While (1) and (2) are usually called equity 
modes, the (3) and (4) are referred to as no-equity ones. Foreign market entry 
mode is also often used as a concept for the description of already established 
operations in the foreign market. Welch, Benito, and Petersen (2007) argue that 
entry mode concept should be applied only for the real (first time) market entry 
while established operations and their modifications should be called foreign 
operation methods. 
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 On the other hand, when it comes to equity-based entries (WOS and JVs), 
the distinction between greenfield investments versus mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) is applicable. Interestingly, many researchers (Nocke and Yeaple 2007; 
Kim 2009; Raff, Ryan, and Stähler 2009; Nagano 2013) refer to these two types 
of investment methods as entry modes types.  
 To overcome inconsistencies in the literature current research uses these 
concepts with following meanings: 
 Foreign market entry mode (entry mode) is an institutional arrangement 
necessary for a company to enter the foreign market in order to source resources 
or sell products and services there. 
 Foreign operation method (operation method) is a form of operations in 
the foreign market including degree of control and commitment of resources 
(WOS, JV, contract, export). 
 Investment method is a type of investment which is employed to establish 
the equity-based type of operations in the foreign market (greenfield or mergers 
and acquisitions). 
 In general, the decision on entry mode choice can be seen as a two-stage 
process (Figure 1). First, it is a choice between equity and non-equity based 
modes. Then, it is one-dimensional if it comes to non-equity based operations – 
the company chooses only the operation method. However, if the decision is taken 
to make an equity-base entry, the entry mode is automatically transformed into 
two-dimensional decision where choices of operation method and investment 
method are made simultaneously. 
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Figure 1. Entry Mode Choice Decision Tree 
2.2.2. Combined Entry Modes/Operation Methods 
 Some researchers (Benito and Welch 1994; Petersen and Welch 2002; 
Benito, Petersen, and Welch 2009; Benito, Petersen, and Welch 2011) stress the 
importance of operation method combinations for international businesses. They 
argue that such combinations are used more frequently than single-method entries. 
Benito, Petersen, and Welch (2011, 803) propose that “companies tend to 
combine modes of operation” in a way that lead to the “unique foreign operation 
mode “packages” for given activities and/or countries” which “are liable to be 
modified over time”. Furthermore, such “packages” may be built from the 
beginning of operations in a particular foreign market or emerge over time.  
 Operation method combinations can be seen as a rational response to the 
complex business reality (Petersen and Welch 2002). Benito, Petersen, and Welch 
(2011, 807) propose that multiple modes are needed to successfully operate on the 
market since single-method entry may be “too unsophisticated to cope with all 
important contingencies”. 
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 Mode/method combinations often are more than just simple add-ons to a 
primary mode. They can be used as a strong strategic tool in achieving company 
goals. Such method “packages” may be developed to generate extra revenue, 
increase control, raise marketing activity, and assure intellectual property rights 
etc. (Benito, Petersen, and Welch 2011). Usually, such combination can be seen as 
instruments of adaptation to the foreign market and, thus, are more interesting 
from the dynamic perspective. 
 In general, following mode/method combinations can be distinguished 
regardless market-adaptation factor (Petersen and Welch 2002; Welch, Benito, 
and Petersen 2007; Benito, Petersen, and Welch 2011):  
- combinations within given value activities;  
- combinations within a given country;  
- “packages” within a given activity-location set. 
Furthermore, Benito, Petersen, and Welch (2011) have found three main 
motives/reasons for mode/method combination:  
- task or product differentiation;  
- political and regulatory demands;  
- adaptation to local market conditions.  
 This shows that both internal and external factors affect the operation 
method “packages”. 
 Interestingly, Benito, Petersen, and Welch (2011) have shown that the use 
of mode/method combinations increased during 2004-2008. However, the 
mode/method combination activity by the companies was significantly different. 
This may indicate organizational learning which leads and influences mode 
development processes as a part of company strategy and organizational 
development (Doz 1996; Inkpen and Currall 2004).  
2.2.3. Entry Modes in Oil and Gas Industry 
 Oil and gas companies operate projects in various countries. Furthermore, 
they often enter the same country few times through different projects. In this way 
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they apply entry mode combination “packages” depending on the number of tasks 
(fields/blocks) they operate in each particular country.  
 Additionally, some of such entries may be conducted in partnership while 
others are built as separate legal entities or simply different projects. Also, oil and 
gas companies can enter the country through greenfield investment (participating 
in licensing rounds) or acquisition (using farm-in agreements and diverse types of 
acquisitions). 
2.3. Regulatory Institutional Environment 
 Regulatory and legal factors often affect the financial and economic 
parameters, establishing conditions and rules of economic agents’ operations at 
the micro level and the economy in general. In such a way they also affect the 
strategies that companies employ in international markets. That’s why institutions 
are thought to be the “rules of the game” (North 1990).  
 These “rules” are two types: institutional environment (macro rules) and 
institutional arrangements (micro rules) (Carson et al. 1999; Davis and North 
1971). Institutional environment is defined as “formal and informal rules 
emanating from the macro level aspects of a society, including the polity, the 
juridical system, cultural norms, and kinship patterns”, while institutional 
arrangements are “the formal and informal micro level rules of exchange devised 
by specific parties to a specific exchange” (Carson et al. 1999, 115). 
 The institutional environment consists of regulatory, normative, and 
cognitive institutions (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002). Regulatory institutions 
(laws) are “regulatory bodies that can influence channels to behave in certain 
ways (patterns) again and again (regeneration)” (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002, 
82), which deal with the pragmatic legitimacy concerns. Normative institutions 
(professions) are “trade associations, professional associations, accreditation 
agencies, or professions themselves that can use social obligation requirements to 
induce and regenerate patterns within channels” (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002, 
82). They are focused on procedural legitimacy requiring the embracement of 
socially accepted norms and behaviors. Cognitive institutions (habitual actions) 
are “culturally supported habits and exert subtle influences on channel behaviors, 
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which then tend to be repeated” (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002, 82) and are 
associated with cognitive legitimacy concerns – taken-for-granted cultural 
account.  
 Within institutional environment institutional arrangements are thought to 
be economically efficient. Thus, institutional environments influence institutional 
arrangements, their form and type. The selection of an institutional arrangement – 
an entry mode choice – is among the most important decisions for international 
firms (Root 1994). This perhaps creates many differences between institutional 
arrangements in distinct environments. For various countries different kinds of 
regulatory institutions may have different impact on institutional arrangements 
and even more on their contractual part. At the same time, some contractual 
elements might be more important in one industry while less important in another. 
 The institutional environment is believed to influence the potential span of 
entry modes in two ways: formal through laws and regulations and informal 
through culture, local business habits, and corruption levels (Meyer et. al. 2009). 
Ingram and Silverman (2002, 20) state that “institutions directly determine what 
arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy 
and to create competitive advantage”. Hence, institutions which exist in the 
foreign market influence the way a firm chooses to enter. 
 Tighter government regulations may create significant barriers to entry.  A 
lack of property rights, excessive government regulation, corruption, and the 
ineffectiveness of legal system in enforcing contracts hinder economic activity in 
many countries (Kshetri and Dholakia 2011). On the other hand, regulatory 
support in the areas of R&D, investments, patents, and labor mobility have 
positive effects.  
 The institutional issues influence both the operation method and the 
investment method decisions simultaneously. Grewal and Dharwadkar (2002) 
propose that if the host-country institutional environment offers attractive 
incentives, the probability of adoption the channel integration level, recommended 
by it, is higher. Additionally, transaction cost theory (Anderson and Gatignon 
1986) argues that companies should choose entry modes that minimize overall 
transaction costs. 
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 The relations between regulatory institutional factors and entry mode 
dimensions analyzed in this study are presented on Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Basic Theoretical Model 
2.3.1. Contract Enforcement 
 Contract enforcement is an important legal factor when it comes to 
international institutional arrangements. It measures “the efficiency of the judicial 
system in resolving a commercial dispute” (The World Bank International 
Financial Corporation 2013a). 
 Zhou and Poppo (2010) have investigated the role of legal enforceability 
with regard to contract explicitness. They have found support for the hypothesis 
that when the perceived legal enforceability is higher, the relationship between 
environmental uncertainty and contract explicitness is stronger. 
 Monitoring and enforcing the contracts are among the factors that affect 
transaction costs when dealing with foreign partners. Brouthers and Nakos (2004) 
state, that the ability to enforce contracts characterizes environmental uncertainty 
of the host country together with ability to control other political and legal risks. 
Henisz (2000) has investigated the influence of contractual and political hazards. 
He has found that the probability of a majority-owned entity as an entry operation 
method increases in the level of independent contractual hazards and decreases in 
the level independent political hazards. Also, Henisz (2000, 340) argues that “the 
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probability of choosing a majority-owned plant as a market entry mode is 
magnified in the presence of political hazards”. 
 Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) argue that companies are sensitive to 
contractual risk-related attributes, such as contract enforceability. Majocchi, 
Mayrhofer, and Camps (2010) have found support for the hypothesis that the 
lower the efficiency of contract enforcement, the more likely the company will 
choose joint ventures rather than non-equity-alliances. The same is applicable to 
the higher political hazards in a country.  
 Taking into account investment method, Chen and Hennart (2004) propose 
that investors making acquisitions in the foreign country bear the costs of target 
inspections and contract enforcement. They argue that this is the reason why 
companies tend to choose partial acquisitions when the contract enforceability is 
poor and are more willing to do full acquisition if they can use better contract 
enforcement tools. Chen and Hennart (2004) suggest that partial acquisitions can 
help MNEs to avoid ex post opportunism from the seller’s side. 
 Generally, it seems that difficult contract enforcement lead to the 
preference of the wholly-owned subsidiary over any kind of on operations that 
require cooperation with partner. 
H1a. Easier contract enforceability decreases the probability of wholly-owned 
subsidiary over joint venture as an entry operation method. 
 Continuing the discussion about the choice between greenfield investment 
and acquisition, Nagano (2013, 100) has found that companies tend to choose 
greenfield method rather than cross-border M&A if the host-country “adequately 
enforces intellectual property rights laws”. Contract enforceability is important 
factor when it comes to any type of agreements. In this sense, to secure 
agreements it company can rely on informal or formal mechanisms, trust or 
control (Das and Teng 1998). When contract enforceability is higher, the need in 
both formal and informal control mechanisms may appear to be lower. 
Consequently, companies will tend to use acquisitions over greenfield 
investments. 
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H1b. Easier contract enforceability decreases the probability of greenfield 
investment over acquisition as an entry investment method.  
2.3.2. Investor Protection 
 Investor protection is another important legal factor when it comes to 
international institutional arrangements. It indicates how much the investors are 
protected against such issues as directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal 
gain or self-dealing etc. (The World Bank International Financial Corporation 
2013c). According to Neto, Brandão, and Cerqueira (2008), investor protection 
plays important role when it comes to different types of entry modes. With the 
better investor protection companies tend to invest in the country more. 
Furthermore, they are willing to commit more resources. 
  Overall, it is logical to assume that if the investor protection is well-
established in the country international companies are more willing to enter with 
the wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
H2a. Better investor protection increases the probability of wholly-owned 
subsidiary over the joint venture as an entry operation method. 
 Rossi and Volpin (2004) have found that companies which come from 
countries with weaker investor protection are more likely to be acquired than 
similar companies from countries with stronger investor protection. On the other 
hand, the acquiring companies are more likely to be from countries with relatively 
stronger investor protection. Neto, Brandão, and Cerqueira (2008) state that 
investor protection seems to influence only mergers and acquisitions and do not 
have influence on other FDI and greenfield investments. Nagano (2013) has also 
found that companies tend to choose acquisitions instead of greenfield 
investments if the host-country can sufficiently implement shareholder rights. 
Thus, better investor protection may motivate companies to choose greenfield 
investments over acquisitions. 
H2b. Better investor protection decreases the probability of greenfield investment 
over acquisition as an entry investment method. 
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2.3.3. Taxation 
 Tax considerations influence any commercial activity. Choosing the 
operation method companies consider the potential tax benefits together with 
other pros and cons for each option. Each legal form (limited liability company, 
partnership, corporation etc.) usually apply different taxation procedures and, 
thus, can propose different advantages for the legal entity and its parent company 
(Ashurst LLP 2011). Hence, tax considerations may also influence the choice of 
commitment and control level which define the operation method. In this sense, 
market entry in cooperation with local partner (JV) may have substantial benefits 
in countries with complex taxation if a partner has a knowledge and experience 
regarding the host-country taxation system. 
 Some combinations of tax factors may attract companies to the choice of 
joint venture while others will propose WOS as a better choice (Ashurst LLP 
2011). Everything else being equal, companies tend to establish subsidiaries in the 
low-tax jurisdiction rather than the high-tax jurisdiction (Auerbach, Devereux, and 
Simpson 2010). Following this logic, if the taxation system of the host-country is 
complex and use high tax rates companies will tend to commit fewer resources. 
Hence, a negative relation between taxation complexity and the choice of WOS 
over JV can be assumed.   
H3a. Higher taxes and complex taxation system decrease the probability of 
wholly-owned subsidiary over joint venture as an entry operation method. 
 Nagano (2013, 100) argues that decreases in corporate tax rates “generally 
attract both inward cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI to the host country”. 
Auerbach and Hassett (1991) argue that tax reforms can change the incentives to 
choose investment in new capital (greenfield) versus investment in the old one 
(acquisition).  Swenson (2001) analyzing the FDI composition within USA argues 
that greenfield investments are more “scared” of high-tax jurisdictions than 
M&As.  
  In 2008, Becker and Fuest presented a theoretical model of tax 
competition where increase in the tax rate raises the number of M&As but 
decreases the number of greenfield investments.  Analyzing tax competition in a 
model with these two investment methods, Becker and Fuest (2011) have found 
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that in such a case tax competition is intensified until there are only greenfield 
investments. They (Becker and Fuest 2011, 485) argue that “an increase in 
corporate taxes raises the number of acquisitions in a country but reduces the total 
number of investment projects”.  
 Hebous, Ruf, and Weichenrieder (2010) have researched the influence of 
the tax rates differences on the location choice for an affiliate using German 
outbond FDI of 3600 firms from 2005 to 2007. Controlling for a firm and 
country-specific characteristics, they have found that M&A investment decision 
are less sensitive to the tax rate differences than greenfield investments when it 
comes to the location choice. They have estimated that 10 percent increase in 
corporate income tax rate leads to 6.4 percent decrease in the probability to make 
greenfield investment into particular country. Even though higher taxes affect 
M&A decisions negatively also, the 10 percent increase in tax rate reduces the 
probability of a country to host M&A only by 3.6 percent. 
 Overall, high taxes and complex taxation seem to lead to the choice of 
acquisition over greenfield investment, while low taxes and simple taxation will 
motivate international companies to enter the country though greenfield. 
H3b. Higher taxes and complex taxation system decrease the probability of 
greenfield investment over acquisition as an entry investment method. 
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3. Methodology and Data Analysis 
3.1. Model 
Based on the foregoing literature review and proposed hypotheses, the 
model for analysis looks as presented on the Figure 2. 
 This model describes the influence of the regulatory institutional 
environment factors on the two dimensions of the equity-based entry modes. For 
this purpose, it includes two
1
 types of variables: 
1) Dependent variables which characterize the two dimensions of the entry 
mode:  
- operation method – choice between wholly-owned subsidiary and 
joint-venture; 
- investment type – choice between greenfield and acquisition; 
2) Independent variables (three groups) which characterize the different 
elements of the host-country regulatory environment: 
- contract enforceability; 
- investor protection; 
- taxation.  
3.2. Variables Description and Data Collection 
Analysis of the model includes three different types of variables: 
dependent, independent and control variables. The detailed description of 
variables is following. 
Data is collected through different secondary sources: official press-
releases, web-pages, companies’ annual report, reports made by international 
organization. For the full list of data sources see Appendix 1. 
                                                 
1
 Control variables are not presented in the basic theoretical model 
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3.2.1. Dependent Variables 
 Dependent variables describe two simultaneous choices (two dimensions 
of entry mode decision) that are made while entering the country. Each dimension 
proposes two alternative choices, which means that in general company has 4 
different options if it is willing to use an equity-based entry.  
 When it comes to operation methods, this research distinguishes between 
joint-ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries. It does not account for majority-
owned and minority-owned joint-ventures as well as equity-based and project-
based ones (the common practice in oil and gas industry is to establish a 
consortium which can have a form both a separate legal entity and a joint project). 
Since companies choose between two discrete options, the operation method is 
presented by the binary categorical variable where 1 encodes the wholly-owned 
subsidiary and 0 represents any kind of joint-venture. 
 Talking about investment method, companies can choose either greenfield 
investment or acquisition. This research treats the newly-established operation, for 
example new licenses awarded to companies, as greenfield investments. All other 
kinds of investments, for instance shares acquisitions and farm-ins, belong to the 
acquisition category. In this sense companies also choose between two discrete 
options. Thus, the investment method is also presented by the binary categorical 
variable where 1 encodes greenfield investment while 0 represents any kind of 
acquisition. 
 The data describing the operation method and investment method in each 
case is collected from such secondary data sources as companies’ annual reports, 
press-releases, and information from companies’ official web-pages (Appendix 1). 
The farm-in agreements are treated as acquisitions that normally result in the joint 
venture operation method. Production sharing agreements/contracts are normally 
treated as joint ventures, however such cases as the Rangkas Block PSC (2008) 
and the Gurita Block (2011) in Indonesia (Lundin Petroleum 2008, 2011) where 
Swedish company Lundin Petroleum holds 100% of interest and the state is nearly 
not participating are assumed to be wholly-owned subsidiaries.  
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3.2.2. Independent Variables 
Independent variables describe three groups of regulatory institutional 
environment factors which are contract enforcement, investor protection, and 
taxation. This research uses The World Bank International Financial Corporation 
Doing Business methodology for factors interpretation and Doing Business 
measures for each specific case. To provide deeper understanding some factors 
are presented by few variables. 
Contract enforcement (CE) factors use Doing Business enforcing contracts 
indicators, in particular number of procedures, time in days, and cost as a 
percentage of the claim. In particular, contract enforcement procedures variable 
describes the total number of procedural steps before a commercial dispute 
reaches the relevant court. Contract enforcement time variable is the time (in 
days) needed “from the moment the plaintiff decides to file the lawsuit in court 
until payment” (The World Bank International Financial Corporation 2013a). 
Contract enforcement % of claim is the percentage of claim which is needed to 
cover all costs, including court costs, enforcement costs and average attorney fees. 
The investor protection index (IPI) measured by The World Bank Doing 
Business is used as a variable describing the investor protection factor. According 
to the Doing Business Ranking protecting investors methodology, it includes 
“three dimensions: transparency of related-party transactions (extent of disclosure 
index), liability for self-dealing (extent of director liability index) and 
shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct (ease of 
shareholder suits index)” (The World Bank International Financial Corporation 
2013c). Essentially, the higher the index the better the investor protection is.  
The taxation is described Doing Business paying taxes measures: tax 
payments, time (in days), and total tax rate (The World Bank International 
Financial Corporation 2013b). Tax payments variable shows the total number of 
taxes and contributions paid per year in a specific country. Taxes administration 
time is the time (in hours) needed “to prepare, file and pay three major types of 
taxes and contributions: the corporate income tax, value added or sales tax, and 
labor taxes” (The World Bank International Financial Corporation 2013b). 
Payable tax is the total tax rate as a share of commercial profit which includes the 
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amount of taxes and other mandatory contributions paid in the second year of 
operation. 
3.2.3. Control Variables 
Essentially, the entry mode choice depends on a variety of factors and not 
only factors that characterize the host-country legal environment. This variety of 
factors also consists of company/micro-level, country/macro-level factors, and 
time.  
To control for their influences the following control variables are used:  
 micro-level factors: cash flow from operations and net income of 
the year prior to the entry mode decision, company’s strategy/policy toward the 
entry modes; 
 macro-level factors: the host-country economic growth, corruption, 
culture, and country of origin (home country); 
 time. 
 Cash-flow from operations and net income of the year prior to the entry 
mode decision variables are accessed from companies’ annual reports and 
financial statements. These variables aim to describe the influence of existing 
financial resources on the entry mode choice. Since companies come from 
different countries and, thus, keep their account in different currencies, the 
analysis use all values converted into millions of USD (US dollar). For this 
purpose, the historical currency rates (OANDA 2013) applicable on the last day of 
the corresponding year are used. 
 Company’s strategy/policy toward the entry modes is represented by the 
categorical variable which uses companies’ names as separate categories. It aims 
to control for the existence of a specific strategy/policy/preference toward the 
entry mode choice which may exist in each company.  
 The macro-level factors can be divided into two groups: one describing the 
host-country and another describing the home country.  
 The information on the host-country factors is collected from the open 
secondary sources of international organization etc. (Appendix 1). The economic 
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growth variable uses The World Bank Data indicators (The World Bank Data 
2013). Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measured by Transparency 
International (Transparency International 2013) describes the host-country 
corruption. It is important to mention that it estimates the corruption levels on the 
scale from 1 to 9 (or 10 to 90), where lower score represents higher corruption 
level and vice versa. The host-country culture is represented by five main 
Hofstede culture dimensions (The Hofstede Centre 2013): power distance (PDI), 
individualism vs. collectivism (IDV), masculinity vs. femininity (MAS), uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI), and short-term vs. long-term orientation (LTO). These 
dimensions and their measures are used as separate variables in the analysis. 
Power distance describes the inequality in power distribution among the 
organization members, where the higher score indicates the higher acceptance of 
power inequalities. Individualism vs. collectivism measures the degree of 
interdependence of society members, and the higher score characterizes the more 
individualistic society. Masculinity vs. femininity dimension describes personal 
motivation factors, perceiving competition/achievement-driven societies (high 
score) as masculine and caring/quality-of-life driven (low score) as feminine. 
Uncertainty avoidance is “the extent to which the members of a culture feel 
threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations” (The Hofstede Centre 2013) 
with higher score indicating the preference to avoid uncertainties. Short-term vs. 
long-term orientation measures the preference of a future-oriented perspective 
over a short-term point of view, where high score describes a long-term oriented 
society. 
 The country-of-origin (home country) factor is used in order to control for 
the entry mode preferences based on the home environment, where the company 
is used to operate. The names of the countries where the companies are 
headquartered are encoded to use this factor as a categorical variable. 
 To control for the changes in choice preferences through time the year of 
entry is used as a control variable. 
3.3. Sampling 
 The sample consists of market entries made by Scandinavian companies 
that work within oil and gas exploration and development. The sample is built this 
Master thesis in GRA 19003   30.08.2013 
Page 23 
way in order to analyze the market entries made by companies with more or less 
the same cultural and country-origin background. For this purpose the study 
assumes Norway, Denmark, and Sweden to be culturally similar countries with 
similar business environments due to the long common and interrelated history.  
 The sample includes market entries made by five companies: one from 
Norway – Statoil, two from Denmark – DONG Energy and Maersk Oil, and two 
from Sweden – Lundin Petroleum and Svenska Petroleum Exploration (Table 1). 
Initially, it has intended to analyze the entry mode choices conducted by these 
companies since 2004. However, due to inconsistencies in the Doing Business 
Methodology which make the observations from 2004-2005 incomparable with 
the observations from the later years, only transactions made starting from 2006 
(including 2013) form the sample. 
Table 1. Information about the Companies 
 Home 
country 
Year of 
establishment 
Core business areas 
Statoil Norway 1972 
Oil and gas 
Petrochemicals 
Renewable energy 
Electrical power 
DONG 
Energy 
Denmark 1972 
Oil and gas 
Renewable energy 
Electrical power 
Maersk Oil Denmark 1962 Oil and gas 
Lundin 
Petroleum 
Sweden 2001 Oil and gas 
Svenska 
Petroleum 
Exploration 
Sweden 1969 Oil and gas 
 This research considers only the transactions for which both operation and 
investment methods are known. Furthermore, it takes into account only 
investment decisions and ignores divestments. So, sales of the shares in WOS 
which result into joint venture are not considered (i.e., Statoil divested 40% of its 
shares in Peregrino heavy oil development and Canadial oil sand project in 2010-
2011 (Statoil 2011)). However, acquisitions of the partners’ shares in the joint 
projects which result in the change of operation mode to the wholly-owned 
subsidiary are taken into account, in particular: 
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- Lunding Petroleum acquired 20% of Carr Production France SARL in 
2007 (owned 80% of shares before) (Lundin Petroleum 2007); 
- Statoil acquired 50% of the Peregrino heavy oil development in Brazil in 
2008 (owned remaining 50% from 2007) (Statoil 2009); 
- Maersk Oil acquired 30% of Dumbarton and Lochranza in UK in 2012 
(owned 70% before) (Maersk Oil 2012). 
 Some other transactions are not taken into account during the analysis for 
a number of reasons. They are: 
1) Strategic cooperation agreements, since they include the broad 
cooperation, in a sense of activity types, which is conducted internationally and 
not in only one specific country: 
- Statoil strategic cooperation/alliance in China 2007 (Statoil 2013b) – 
domestic and international E&P, R&D, gas value chain, new energy and 
downstream; 
- Statoil strategic cooperation/alliances in USA 2008 – jointly exploring 
unconventional gas opportunities worldwide and Joint Exploration Team for the 
Gulf of Mexico (Statoil 2009); 
- DONG Energy strategic cooperation/alliance (with Gazprom) in Russia 
2011 – promoting the use of natural gas in Europe as a cleaner alternative to coal 
and a complement to the expanding renewable power generation capacity (DONG 
Energy 2011); 
- Statoil strategic cooperation/alliance (with Rosneft) in Russia 2012 –  
jointly explore offshore frontier areas off Russia and Norway and to conduct joint 
technical studies on two onshore Russian assets (Statoil 2013a); 
2) Renegotiated/renewed projects such as the new mixed company, 
Petrocedeño S.A., established in 2008 for the Sincor Project in Venezuela, where 
Statoil is a partner (Statoil 2009); 
3) Projects that substitute another projects for any reason as, for example, 
new acreage Cendrawasih VII (CVII) in Indonesia, where Lundin Petroleum is a 
partner, production sharing agreement for which has been signed in 2013 in order 
to substitute the existing block acreage which was declared a protected nature 
conservation area (Lundin Petroleum 2013). 
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 When it comes to the host-country regulatory institutional environment, 
the transactions done in 2004-2005 are excluded from the analysis due to the 
inconsistency of the Doing Business Methodology as mentioned earlier. 
Furthermore, Danish companies’ entries to Greenland and Faroe Islands are not 
taken into account since these countries are parts of the Kingdom of Denmark and 
use Danish law, even though they were granted the “home rule” and have a 
substantial sovereignty.  
The dates of the taken decision to enter (intention) are taken into account. 
When it comes to the licensing rounds (APA, Norwegian, UK etc.) the dates of 
application are the dates of the decision to enter. For the acquisitions, including 
farm-ins, the date of agreement is the date of decision, and not the date when the 
transaction is formally approved by authorities and/or fully closed. Accordingly, 
the analysis uses the earlier year for the following transactions: 
- Statoil and Gazprom signed a framework agreement to organize the 
design, financing, construction and operation of the Shtokman (Russia) phase one 
infrastructure in 2007;  the consortium of three companies Statoil, Gazpron, and 
French Total, Shtokman Development AG, was established in 2008 (Statoil 2008, 
2009); 
- Statoil and Lukoil submitted the winning bid for developing the 
West Qurna 2 field in Iraq in 2009, but the development and production contract 
for West Qurna 2 with Iraqi authorities was signed in 2010 (Statoil 2010); 
- Maersk Oil acquired Devon assets in US GoM in 2009, the 
transaction was completed in 2010 and didn’t affect the financial results of 2009 
(Maersk Oil 2010). 
The total sample size is 122 (Table 2). However, due to the missing values 
for some independent and control variables in some cases, number of observations 
included into analysis may be smaller.  
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Table 2. Distribution of Observations between Companies and Countries 
Country of origin 
Total number of 
transactions 
Company 
Number of 
transactions per 
company 
Norway 50 Statoil 50 
Denmark 26 
DONG Energy 4 
Maersk Oil 22 
Sweden 46 
Lundin Petroleum 31 
Svenska 
Petroleum 
Exploration 
15 
Total 122 
3.4. Data Analysis 
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The following analysis uses logistic regression tools to build the prediction 
models for operation and investment methods. Importantly, this kind of analysis 
does not assume the normal distribution of data. However, descriptive statistics 
for variables in each group (two groups in two dimensions) may provide some 
preliminary insights. 
When it comes to operation methods (i.e., wholly-owned subsidiary and 
joint venture) (Table 3), both mean and range (i.e., max – min) are nearly equal 
for time needed on tax administration. This indicates that the variations of this 
measure in both groups are more or less the same. Thus, tax administration time 
probably have no influence on the choice of operation method. Similar situation 
appear regarding tax payable and power distance, even though their ranges in two 
groups differ more. Interestingly, masculinity versus femininity cultural 
dimension has very different means in two groups within pretty equal ranges. This 
may indicate the significant influence of MAS dimension on the choice of the 
operation method. 
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Table 3. Operation Method Groups’ Descriptive Statistics 
  Wholly-Owned Subsidiary  Joint Venture 
  max min mean  max min mean 
 Regulatory Environment Factors 
CE procedures 55.00 14.00 34.36  45.00 14.00 29.86 
CE time 1715.00 87.00 468.10  616.00 217.00 389.64 
CE costs 126.50 4.20 21.90  122.70 9.00 26.14 
IPI 8.70 2.00 6.43  8.30 2.70 7.23 
Tax payments 94.00 3.00 18.49  51.00 3.00 14.86 
Tax time 2600.00 58.00 370.55  2600.00 5200 380.14 
Tax payable 74.20 21.50 44.59  71.10 28.80 44.61 
 Micro-level Factors 
CF from operations 22928.80 68.19 7037.51  19853.85 82.25 8078.08 
Net income 13080.18 -1057.47 3408.38  13080.18 73.59 4123.39 
 Macro-level Factors 
Economic growth 22.59 -4.18 3.37  10.83 -3.11 2.43 
CPI 9.30 1.50 5.91  8.70 2.40 6.63 
PDI 104.00 18.00 48.66  78.00 28.00 46.32 
IDV 91.00 14.00 63.45  91.00 14.00 71.55 
MAS 70.00 8.00 39.20  68.00 8.00 56.64 
UAI 95.00 23.00 52.04  86.00 35.00 48.00 
LTO 80.00 16.00 38.26  65.00 23.00 32.95 
 Discussing the data grouped based on the investment method (Table 4), 
contract enforcement procedures means and ranges are quite close. This fact 
proposes that contract enforcement procedures may not influence the choice of 
investment method. Also, contract enforcement costs and long-term orientation 
dimension have very similar descriptive statistics and, thus, with high probability 
do not influence the choice between greenfield investment and acquisition. 
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Table 4. Investment Method Groups’ Descriptive Statistics 
  Greenfield  Acquisition 
  max min mean  max min mean 
 Regulatory Environment Factors 
CE procedures 55.00 14.00 33.53  51.00 14.00 33.57 
CE time 1011.00 87.00 412.75  1715.00 87.00 505.83 
CE costs 126.50 4.20 23.74  122.70 4.20 21.31 
IPI 8.30 2.30 6.78  8.70 2.00 6.31 
Tax payments 52.00 3.00 14.38  94.00 3.00 22.19 
Tax time 2600.00 58.00 337.09  2600.00 52.00 417.45 
Tax payable 74.20 24.70 42.79  70.60 21.50 46.86 
 Micro-level Factors 
CF from operations 19853.85 68.19 7436.74  22928.80 68.19 6958.71 
Net income 13080.18 -1057.47 3649.41  13080.18 -1057.47 3396.17 
 Macro-level Factors 
Economic growth 22.59 -4.18 2.63  22.59 -3.11 3.94 
CPI 9.30 1.50 6.55  9.00 1.80 5.41 
PDI 95.00 18.00 43.48  104.00 31.00 54.68 
IDV 91.00 14.00 67.34  91.00 14.00 62.09 
MAS 70.00 8.00 40.82  70.00 8.00 45.68 
UAI 95.00 23.00 48.90  95.00 35.00 54.36 
LTO 80.00 23.00 36.98  65.00 16.00 37.34 
3.4.2. Relations Analysis 
 Before going to the estimation of the operation and investment methods 
prediction models, the analysis of relations between variables is used. 
 For this purpose the Pearson correlation coefficients are used for the 
description of the relations between numeric variables. The results are presented 
in the Table 5. 
 The correlations between independent and control variables are not high in 
general.  
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 For the estimation of the relations between categorical (Table 7) as well as 
categorical and numeric (Table 6) variables analysis uses Pearson Chi-square 
coefficient. This tool works in the same manner as the Pearson correlation 
coefficient. However, it does not indicate the strength or direction of the 
relationship.  
Table 6. Pearson Chi-Square Crosstable for Categorical and Numeric Variables 
 
Company Home country 
Operation 
method 
Investment 
method 
CE procedures 134.613** 99.848*** 27.404 32.443 
CE days 193.057* 123.580*** 44.730 57.120* 
CE % of claim 208.163** 138.612*** 42.973 60.856** 
IPI 119.203*** 81.879*** 25.862 30.035** 
Tax payments 144.759* 95.555*** 33.849 36.384 
Tax hours 181.030* 121.231*** 38.934 45.381 
Tax % 210.216 132.642* 54.587 61.907 
Year 35.201 21.293* 6.298 4.222 
CF from 
operations 
488.000*** 244.000*** 21.302 27.819 
Net income 488.000*** 244.000*** 21.302 27.819 
Ec. growth 269.167 151.372 62.672 72.998 
CPI 177.506** 100.832** 43.172 46.039 
PDI 103.923*** 76.649*** 21.635 22.308 
IDV 113.744*** 85.958*** 24.447 24.141 
MAS 118.836*** 86.274*** 26.666 25.047 
UAI 93.375*** 70.264*** 21.981 25.359** 
LTO 93.035*** 72.541*** 19.667** 16.489 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Interestingly, Pearson Chi-Square indicates the relation between operation 
method choice and the company. If further supported, it may confirm the 
proposition that each company has its own strategy or policy for the entry mode 
choice. 
Table 7. Pearson Chi-Square Crosstable for Categorical Variables 
 Operation method Investment method 
Company 8.222* 3.642 
Country 0.902 2.344 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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3.4.3. Logistic Regressions 
This research aims to estimate the influence of regulatory institutional 
factors on the two entry mode dimensions in a form of probability prediction for 
each alternative. For this purpose the analysis is shaped as two separate logistic 
regressions (for two choices that are made simultaneously). One of them estimates 
the probability of the choice of wholly-owned subsidiary over joint-venture 
company as an operation method (Table 9) while another analyzes the probability 
of the choice of greenfield investment over acquisition as an investment method 
(Table 10). 
Due to the large number of control variables, accounting for categorical 
variables encoded as dummy variables (Table 8), separate logistic regressions are 
conducted to control for different effects. Afterwards the final models are 
presented for each entry mode dimension. They include variables that have shown 
to have significant effects according to estimates given by foregoing logistic 
regression analyses with different control variables. 
Table 8. Codings for Categorical Variables 
 Parameter Coding 
 Company (1) Company (2) Company (3) Company (4) 
DONG 
Energy 
1 0 0 0 
Lundin 
Petroleum 
0 1 0 0 
Maersk Oil 0 0 1 0 
Statoil 0 0 0 1 
Svenska 
Petroleum 
Exploration 
0 0 0 0 
 Country (1) Country (2)  
Denmark 1 0  
Norway 0 1 
Sweden 0 0 
3.4.3.1. Operation Method Prediction Model 
When it comes to the final equation of the operation method prediction 
model, two factors have shown the significant influence (Table 9). They are 
number of procedures in contract enforcement and masculinity versus femininity 
cultural dimension. Interestingly, intercept of the model is not significantly 
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different from 0, which means that oil and gas companies apply the two operation 
methods with the same frequencies (50% of cases correspond to each option).  
The number of contract enforcement procedures has a negative effect on 
the choice of wholly-owned subsidiary over the joint venture. For example, each 
additional procedure decreases the odd ratio of WOS occurrence by 5.45% 
everything else being equal. Interestingly, the contract enforcement cost 
coefficient becomes insignificant when the contract enforcement time is excluded 
from the equation. This may be due to relations between contract enforcement 
variables and indicate the presence of multicollinearity in the model.  
The masculine versus feminine cultural dimension has a positive effect on 
the choice of the wholly-owned subsidiary as an operation method. For example, 
if the host-country is more competition-driven so that the masculinity score on the 
Hofstede scale increases by 1, the odd ratio of WOS choice increases by 4.71% 
everything else being equal. 
The Chi-square value of the Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients indicates 
that adding the variables to the operation method prediction model has 
significantly increased the ability to predict the occurrence of greenfield 
investment (significant beyond 0.01). The Cox and Snell R Square and the 
Nagelkerke R Square are not high (13.9 and 21.6% respectively) due to the fact 
that the models account for only few factors that influence the entry mode choice. 
However, taking into account a great variety of factors that influence these 
decisions (i.e., see Ghemawat 2001), the model explains relatively big part of 
variation.  
The -2 Log Likelihood of the final model lies in-between the same 
estimates for previously analyzed models and, thus, indicates quite good 
goodness-of-fit. So, the model describes the data well. Furthermore, the Chi-
square value of Hoshmer and Lemeshow Test shows that the model is correctly 
specified. It tests whether the expected event rates in subgroups match the 
expected ones in the model population or not. Besides, there are no outliers 
outside three standard deviations. Thus, the conclusion about the overall good 
model fit can be made.  
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Table 9. Operation Method Prediction Models (1 – WOS, 0 – JV) 
 Culture 
(5) 
Culture 
(4) 
Company 
and time 
Country 
and time 
Legal 
factors 
Final 
model 
N of observations 85 101 116 116 116 105 
 Regression Coefficients 
Constant -48.526 -7.145 234.819 181.540 -5.204 -2.127 
 Regulatory Environment Factors 
CE procedures -0.155* -0.065 -0.072 -0.057 -0.076 -0.056* 
CE time -0.006 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001  
CE costs 0.330 0.036 0.026 0.028* 0.027* 0.011 
IPI 2.031 0.000 0.466 0.542 0.537  
Tax payments 0.058 -0.022 -0.001 -0.009 0.001  
Tax time 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001  
Tax payable 0.017 0.079 0.022 0.021 0.024  
 Micro-level Factors 
Company (1)   21.165    
Company (2)   19.982    
Company (3)   18.425    
Company (4)   18.845    
CF from operations   0.000 0.000 0.000  
Net income   0.000 0.000 0.000  
 Time Factor 
Year   -0.129 -0.093   
 Macro-level Factors 
Country (1)    -0.060   
Country (2)    0.616   
Economic growth -0.056 0.142 0.069 0.012 0.022  
CPI 0.801 0.166 0.131 0.058 0.068  
 Cultural Dimensions 
PDI -0.066 -0.032     
IDV 0.086 -0.007     
MAS 0.065 0.075**    0.046*** 
UAI 0.219 0.020     
LTO 0.245      
 Regression Analysis 
Omnibus Tests of 
Model Coefficients 
(Chi-square) 
23.680** 24.078** 24.518* 15.554 14.944 15.693*** 
-2 Log Likelihood 66.648 81.798 88.170 97.134 97.743 92.105 
Cox and Shell R
2
 0.243 0.212 0.191 0.125 0.121 0.139 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.372 0.327 0.307 0.202 0.195 0.216 
Hoshmer and 
Lemeshow Test  
(Chi-square) 
3.449 6.163 5.744 9.791 11.610 3.454 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
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3.4.3.1. Investment Method Prediction Model 
In the final equation for investment method prediction model, five factors 
have shown the significant influence. Three of them represent the analyzed 
regulatory environment factors: number of tax payments, number of procedures in 
contract enforcement, and costs of contract enforcement as a percentage of claim.  
The other two are control variables, in particular year of entry and 
Corruption Perceptions Index. Interestingly, the significantly different from 0 
coefficient next to the year variable indicates the declining trend – the probability 
to choose greenfield investment over acquisition in oil and gas exploration and 
development is lower each year. On average companies prefer to choose 
greenfield investment over acquisition (75.51% vs. 44.49%) as indicated by the 
intercept-only model. 
Both contract enforcement procedures number and costs have positive 
influence of the choice of greenfield investment over the acquisition as an 
investment method. For example, one additional procedure increases the odd of 
greenfield occurrence by 10.30% everything else being equal. When it comes to 
the costs, the increase in percentage of claim 1(%) leads to the 5.55% increase in 
odd of greenfield choice everything else being equal. 
The number of tax payments has a negative effect on the choice of the 
greenfield investment over the acquisition. Everything else being equal, the 
increase in taxation procedures by 1 leads to the 6.48% decrease in the odd ratio 
of greenfield investment. 
Interestingly, the dummy variables encoding Statoil (among companies) 
and Norway (among countries) have estimated coefficients significantly different 
from 0. However, Norway is Statoil’s home-country and the majority of analyzed 
observations are based on Statoil’s operations (since it is the biggest company 
within oil and gas exploration and development among analyzed ones). So, the 
significance of estimated coefficients may be explained by a specific 
strategy/policy toward the investment methods which Statoil as a really big 
company may use in its activities. On the other hand, this may be explained 
simply by the fact that Statoil’s operations have a majority in the sample. In order 
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not to build false conclusions further, the company and country variables are 
excluded from the final analysis. 
The -2 Log Likelihood of the final model lies in-between the same 
estimates for previously analyzed models indicating relatively good goodness-of-
fit. The Cox and Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square are not high (19.8 
and 26.5% respectively) due to the fact that the models account for only few 
factors that influence the entry mode choice. However, accounting for a great 
variety of factors that influence decisions (i.e., Ghemawat 2001), the model 
explains relatively big part of the variation.  
The Chi-square value of the Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients 
Coefficients indicates that adding these variables to the investment method 
prediction model has significantly increased the ability to predict the occurrence 
of greenfield investment (significant beyond 0.01). Furthermore, the Chi-square 
value of Hoshmer and Lemeshow Test shows that the model is correctly specified. 
Also, there are no outliers outside three standard deviations. All in all, good model 
fit is concluded. 
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Table 10. Investment Method Prediction Models (1 – Greenfield, 0 – Acquisition) 
 Culture 
(5) 
Culture 
(4) 
Company 
and time 
Country 
and time 
Legal 
factors 
Final model 
N of observations 85 101 116 116 116 118 
 Regression Coefficients 
Constant -10.312 3.984 883.667** 885.365** -3.208 859.991*** 
 Regulatory Environment Factors 
CE procedures 0.031 0.056 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.064* 0.098*** 
CE time -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  
CE costs 0.259 0.024 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.040** 0.054*** 
IPI 
2.438 
(.284) 
0.024 -0.096 -0.089 -0.056  
Tax payments 0.071 0.014 -0.092** -0.092** -0.039 -0.067*** 
Tax time 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Tax payable -0.058 -0.047 -0.007 -0.009 -0.013  
 Micro-level Factors 
Company (1)   0.776    
Company (2)   0.268    
Company (3)   0.759    
Company (4)   3.232*    
CF from operations   0.000* 0.000* 0.000  
Net income   0.000** 0.000* 0.000  
 Time Factor 
Year   -0.443** -0.443**  -0.431*** 
 Macro-level Factors 
Country (1)    0.566   
Country (2)    3.023*   
Economic growth -0.039 0.052 0.093 0.091 0.119* 0.061 
CPI -0.145 -0.130 0.476*** 0.466** 0.391** 0.418** 
 Cultural Dimensions 
PDI -0.181 -0.073     
IDV -0.137 0.003     
MAS 0.030 -0.006     
UAI 0.121 0.007     
LTO 0.136      
 Regression Analysis 
Omnibus Tests of 
Model Coefficients 
(Chi-square) 
17.562 20.906* 39.042*** 38.940*** 22.585** 26.010*** 
-2 Log Likelihood 95.031 115.514 120.075 120.176 136.531 135.908 
Cox and Shell R
2
 0.187 0.187 2.286 0.285 0.177 0.198 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.254 0.252 0.383 0.382 0.237 0.265 
Hoshmer and 
Lemeshow Test 
(Chi-square) 
5.887 14.103* 7.750 5.398 9.430 7.292 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
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3.5. Evaluation of Hypotheses 
Three hypotheses are supported based on the finding from the foregoing 
analysis (Table 11). 
First of all, the negative effect of the contract enforcement procedures 
number on the choice of WOS over JV is found. Since, greater number of 
procedures means greater bureaucracy and complexity in contract enforcement, 
this finding supports hypothesis H1a. 
Secondly, the analysis supports the proposition that if contract 
enforceability is easy companies tend to choose acquisition as an investment 
method (H1b). The both number of procedures and costs needed to solve the 
dispute have significant effects here. 
 Finally, the statistical evidence supports the negative effect of high taxes 
and complex taxation system on the greenfield over acquisition choice (H3b). 
Hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H3a have not been supported by the conducted 
statistical analysis. A number of possible explanations for this exists. The 
influences assumed by these hypotheses may be so small, that the analyzed data 
sample is too small to verify it. However, there is also a possibility that such 
effects do not exist at all. It does not mean that these factors do not influence the 
entry mode decisions. They may simply not influence these choices in the 
analyzed industry and activity – oil and gas exploration and development. 
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Table 11. Hypotheses Analysis Summary 
H Statement 
Supported or 
not 
Comments 
H1a. 
Easier contract enforceability 
decreases the probability of 
wholly-owned subsidiary over 
joint venture as an entry 
operation method. 
Supported 
Negative effect: the harder the contract 
enforcement the lower probability of 
WOS (each additional procedure 
decreases the odd ratio of WOS 
occurrence by 5.45%) 
H1b. 
Easier contract enforceability 
decreases the probability of 
greenfield investment over 
acquisition as an entry 
investment method 
Supported 
Positive effect: the harder the contract 
enforcement the higher the probability of 
JV (one additional procedure increases 
the odd of greenfield occurrence by 
10.30%)  
H2a. 
Better investor protection 
increases the probability of 
wholly-owned subsidiary over 
the joint venture as an entry 
operation method. 
Not 
supported 
- 
H2b. 
Better investor protection 
decreases the probability of 
greenfield investment over 
acquisition as an entry 
investment method. 
Not 
supported 
- 
H3a. 
Higher taxes and complex 
taxation system decrease the 
probability of wholly-owned 
subsidiary over joint venture 
as an entry operation method. 
Not 
supported 
- 
H3b. 
Higher taxes and complex 
taxation system decrease the 
probability of greenfield 
investment over acquisition 
as an entry investment 
method. 
Supported 
Negative effect: the higher the 
complexity of taxation the lower the 
probability of green field investment 
(increase in taxation procedures by 1 
leads to the 6.48% decrease in the odd 
ratio of greenfield investment) 
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4. Discussion and Conclusions 
4.1. Theoretical Contribution 
This research contributes to the better understanding of the host-country 
regulatory institutional environment influence on the entry mode choice. In 
particular, it looks into the two-dimensional entry mode choice in oil and gas 
industry estimating probabilities for the choice of alternatives on each dimension 
(operation and investment method). 
4.1.1. Operation Method Choice 
When it comes to operation method, on average oil and gas companies 
choose both wholly-owned subsidiary and joint-venture with 50% probability 
(intercept in the regression is not significantly different from 0) for exploration 
and development activities. Interestingly, only contract enforcement factors 
(among analyzed regulatory factors) influence the decision to choose wholly-
owned subsidiary versus joint venture. Not surprisingly, contract enforcement 
plays important role in oil and gas industry, since the joint venture is a common 
operation method in oil in gas. It is in line with Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) 
argument that companies are sensitive to contract enforceability issues since if 
low it may increase contractual risks. Furthermore, the most influential is the 
bureaucracy which characterizes contract enforcement, namely number of 
procedures needed to solve a commercial dispute. As predicted, with increase in 
bureaucracy/complexity of contract enforcement the probability to choose wholly-
owned subsidiary over joint venture decreases. The possible reason entails the 
risks of partner opportunism and moral hazards (Henisz 2000; Zhou and Poppo 
2010). Furthermore, this finding is in line with Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) 
and Brouthers and Nakos (2004) who see contract enforceability as an 
environmental uncertainty and risk-related factor. 
Interestingly, such cultural dimension as masculinity vs. femininity 
influences the decision on the operation method. Entering competition-driven or 
so-called masculine cultures, companies tend to choose wholly-owned 
subsidiaries over joint operations. The possible explanation is the fact that in 
masculine cultures people/companies are more willing to compete than to 
cooperate as in feminine ones (The Hofstede Centre 2013). Since the possible 
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joint-venture partner is often a local company, the reliability and trustworthiness 
of it may be lower if it comes from a masculine culture. 
The results about the operation method decision are summarized in the 
Figure 3. 
Applied Operation Method 
Wholly-owned subsidiary Joint venture 
when the host-country environment is characterized by 
Less bureaucracy (less procedures) in 
solving disputes 
Masculine culture 
More bureaucracy (more procedures) in 
solving disputes 
Feminine culture 
Figure 3. Operation Method Choice Depending on the Host-country Environment 
4.1.2. Investment Method Choice 
Talking about the choice of investment method, generally oil and gas 
companies prefer greenfield investments over acquisitions (75.51% probability vs. 
24.49%). However, this probability has a declining trend through time (time factor 
has a negative influence). So, this situation may change in the future. 
Among the regulatory institutional factors, contract enforcement and 
taxation influence the investment method decision. More specifically, if a host-
country has more bureaucratic and costly contract enforcement mechanisms, 
companies prefer greenfield investments to acquisitions. This may be explained 
by the complexity of acquisition transaction and its possible need for different 
agreements. As argued by Chen and Hennart (2004), international acquisitions 
lead to increase in target inspections and contract enforcement costs. 
Also, with a greater number of tax payments per year companies are more 
willing to enter the market through different acquisition types. The possible 
reason for such decision is the knowledge about dealing with complex taxation 
which an acquisition target may have developed during its operations. 
Remarkably, total tax rate has not shown a significant influence, even though 
many researchers (Swenson 2001; Becker and Fuest 2008; Hebous, Ruf, and 
Weichenrieder 2010; Nagano 2013) have found evidence for this relationship. 
This may be explained by industry specificity, in particular highly regulated 
environment and royalties paid to the host-country governments. 
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Remarkably, even though cultural factors have not shown significant 
influence on the choice of investment method, the corruption level affects this 
decision. Overall, companies tend to make greenfield investments into the 
countries with low corruption levels (with high Corruption Perceptions Index). 
These results are summarized in the Figure 4. 
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 Less bureaucracy (less procedures) and expensive (lower 
percentage of claim to cover costs) in contract enforcement 
More tax payments per year 
Higher corruption (lower CPI) 
Figure 4. Investment Method Choice Depending on the Host-country Environment 
4.1.3. Two-Dimensional Entry Mode Choice 
Previously discussed results on the operation and investment method 
decisions can be summarized in a 2x2 matrix (Figure 5). Such summary provides 
a better understanding of the entry mode choice among four alternatives 
(greenfield WOS, greenfield JV, acquired WOS, and acquired JV) made by oil 
and gas companies in their exploration and development activity based on the 
host-country institutional environment.  
Interestingly, the investor protection does not have a significant influence 
on the choice among the four entry options available to the oil and gas companies 
when it comes to exploration and development.  
Overall, companies choose to establish new wholly-owned entities in 
countries with expensive contract enforcement and low complexity of taxation 
(few payments). Furthermore, such entry mode is even more preferred if the host 
country is characterized low corruption levels and achievement-oriented culture.  
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 Applied Operation Method 
Wholly-owned subsidiary Joint venture 
when the host-country environment is characterized by 
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 Contract enforcement: 
- Expensive  
- Average bureaucracy  
Few tax payments per year 
Low corruption level 
Masculine culture 
Contract enforcement: 
- Expensive 
- Highly-bureaucratic  
Few tax payments per year 
Low corruption level 
Feminine culture 
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Contract enforcement: 
- Cheap 
- Low bureaucracy  
Many tax payments per year 
High corruption level 
Masculine culture 
Contract enforcement: 
- Cheap 
- Average bureaucracy  
Many tax payments per year 
High corruption level 
Feminine culture 
Figure 5. Two-dimensional Model of Entry Mode Choice Depending on the Host-country 
Environment 
On the other hand, companies prefer to enter through the partial 
acquisition into the highly-corrupted countries with feminine cultures, cheap 
contract enforcement, and complex taxation. This supports Chen and Hennart 
(2004) statement that companies prefer full acquisitions in countries with better 
contract enforcement tools. Two-dimensional Model of Entry Mode Choice 
suggests that the key difference lies in the needed number of procedures to solve 
the dispute, their complexity, and corresponding bureaucracy when it comes to the 
choice between partial and full acquisitions.  
The two remained entry options (greenfield joint venture and full 
acquisition) are applied in the environment that lie in-between of the discussed 
cases. For more details see Figure 5. 
Everything else being equal, newly-established WOS and JV appear with 
the same probabilities on average. The same applies to acquired ones. However, 
the chances for greenfield WOS are higher than for full acquisition and also 
newly-established JV appear more often than acquired ones (Table 12). 
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Table 12. Probability Distribution of the Entry Mode Choices 
 Operation method 
Wholly-owned subsidiary Joint venture 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
ty
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e 
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en
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37.755% 37.755% 
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12.245% 12.245% 
4.2. Managerial Implications 
 This research indicates the regulatory environment factors that influence 
the entry mode decisions in oil and gas industry when it comes to exploration and 
development activities. The results can be generalized to the oil and gas 
companies with origin in Scandinavia. Thus, the findings are the most valuable for 
companies coming from Scandinavian countries as a population of the analyzed 
sample. However, they provide important insight for oil and gas companies 
worldwide. 
Companies’ managers can use the developed framework as a guideline while 
entering foreign market. Furthermore, the framework can be also customized as a 
basis for the strategy development or analysis of companies’ international 
operations in exploration and development. 
4.3. Limitations and Propositions for Further Research  
This research accounts for only one industry - oil and gas, which is 
furthermore limited to the only type of activity - exploration and development. 
Also, with regard to the foreign operation method options it distinguishes only 
between joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary due to the specificity of this 
given type of activity. On the other hand, it accounts for the choice between 
greenfield investments and acquisitions which gives a broader perspective on the 
entry mode decision. Further research is needed for other types of activities and 
industries. Remarkably, the hypotheses that are not supported by this study may 
find support in the analysis for other industries. 
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The study analyses only investment part of foreign operation methods, 
fully ignoring the divestments (i.e., farm-out agreements) and other after-entry 
decisions and modifications. Nevertheless, the mode combinations within given 
activity-location sets are included into analysis. This indicates the need for a 
complex and dynamic study of entry modes.  
The current research does not account for the changes in the regulatory 
environment and how such changes influence the foreign operation methods 
(after-entry decisions). Dynamic research may overcome this limitation 
accounting for changes in regulatory environments and their influence on the 
after-entry decisions and adjustments. For such purposes system dynamics 
methods can be used.  
The question of the perception of regulatory environment should be further 
investigated. When it comes to the differences between the home and host 
environments, they may influence strategic decisions through managers’ 
subjective perceptions more than through objective measures. 
The declining trend in the choice of greenfield investment versus 
acquisition should be further investigated. The understanding of reasons for it may 
help oil and gas companies in strategy development and indicate the directions of 
the industry development. 
4.4. Concluding Notes 
Using the unique and detailed dataset from Scandinavian oil and gas 
companies this study contributes to the literature on the entry mode choice with 
further development of the two-dimensional entry mode model. Furthermore, it 
provides empirical evidence and deep insight on the entry mode choice in the oil 
and gas exploration and development. Specifically, companies choose to establish 
new wholly-owned entities in countries with expensive contract enforcement and 
simple taxation and the partial acquisition in the countries with opposite 
characteristics. The two other entry options lie in-between. 
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Summary  
This preliminary thesis report introduces the study about the host-country 
regulatory institutional environment influence on the entry mode choice 
conducted as a Master thesis. First of all, the importance and relevance of such a 
research is presented. Then the brief literature review is provided and the 
hypotheses are built. Later the proposed methodology and data collection are 
discussed. At the end, the plan for further research progress is presented. 
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Introduction 
 The choice of a market entry mode is thought to be one of the most 
important questions in international business (Morschett, Schramm-Klein, and 
Swoboda 2010). According to Werner (2002), entry modes are on the third place 
among the most researched fields in international management. An entry mode 
itself can be defined as “a structural agreement that allows a firm to implement its 
product market strategy in a host country either by carrying out only the 
marketing operations (i.e., via export modes), or both production and marketing 
operations there by itself or in partnership with others (contractual modes, joint 
ventures, wholly owned operations)” (Sharma and Erramilli 2004, 2). 
The influence of the institutional environment on the choice of entry mode 
has been discussed intensively in the literature. Despite the large amount of 
research conducted within the field of foreign operation methods using different 
perspectives and approaches, it is still hard to answer the question of why 
companies choose particular entry modes in different institutional contexts. 
Osland, Taylor, and Zou (2001) argue that the entry mode decision is highly 
complex, since many different factors (both target market factors and within-
company factors) affect it. It seems that there is no ideal entry mode, because 
different companies often apply different entry strategies in the same market 
basing on different arguments and considering different sets of factors. Because of 
foreign operations complexity within regions, countries, industries, and even each 
particular company, it often seems that theory does not match business reality.  
 One of the explanations for the entry mode choice, which exist in the 
literature, is based on the conditions of the host-country institutional environment. 
A number of researchers have addressed this question. However, the gained 
research results are often contradictory and inconclusive. Grewal and Dharwadkar 
(2002) see the development of measures for assessing the extent of the various 
institutional mechanisms’ influence among the most important research 
challenges.  
 When it comes to research on the host-country regulatory environment 
influence on the entry mode choice, the restrictions on foreign ownership are the 
most commonly studied factor and conclusions about their influence are 
substantial. However, in majority of cases those studies are focused only on 
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wholly-owned subsidiary vs. joint-venture or wholly-owned subsidiary vs. 
contractual entry modes choices, and thus they lack more general discussion 
(Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Morschett, Schramm-Klein, and Swoboda 2010). 
 Such regulatory institutional factors as contract enforcement and investor 
protection have gained relatively little attention with regard to the entry mode 
choice, even though they are thought to be among the most important host-
country characteristics (Brouthers and Nakos 2004; Agarwal and Ramaswami 
1992; Neto, Brandão, and Cerqueira 2008). Also, the international trade and 
protectionist policies influence on the entry mode has not been studied enough to 
provide any strong evidence about it (Morschett, Schramm-Klein, and Swoboda 
2010). 
 The present research looks into relations between institutional 
environment and institutional arrangements, namely regulatory environment and 
modes of foreign entry, and tries to fill in gaps left in the previous studies. The 
results from such research will contribute with new findings about institutional 
environment’s influence on institutional arrangements in international business. It 
will help researchers to understand better which regulatory institutional 
environment elements influence the entry modes decisions and in which way. It 
will also highlight regulatory environment elements the managers should pay 
attention to while entering a new market. At the same time, it might provide 
recommendations about the most suitable and efficient entry mode within various 
institutional environments. 
 Overall the research aims to answer the question: 
How do such regulatory institutional environment factors as restrictions on 
foreign ownership, contract enforceability, investor protection, international 
trade and protectionism influence the choice of wholly-owned subsidiary, joint-
venture, contractual entry mode, exporting as an entry mode?  
 To answer the research question, first of all the existing literature will be 
reviewed including relevant studies as a basis for hypotheses development. Then 
the model will be built and evaluated.  
 
Preliminary Thesis Report GRA 19003  15.01.2013 
Page 3 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 Regulatory and legal factors often affect the financial and economic 
parameters, establishing conditions and rules of economic agents’ operations at 
the micro level and the economy in general. That’s why institutions are thought to 
be the “rules of the game” (North 1990).  
 These “rules” are two types: institutional environment (macro rules) and 
institutional arrangements (micro rules) (Carson et al. 1999; Davis and North 
1971). Institutional environment is defined as “formal and informal rules 
emanating from the macro level aspects of a society, including the policy, the 
juridical system, cultural norms, and kinship patterns”, while institutional 
arrangements are “the formal and informal micro level rules of exchange devised 
by specific parties to a specific exchange” (Carson et al. 1999, 115). 
 The institutional environment consists of regulatory, normative, and 
cognitive institutions (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002). Regulatory institutions 
(laws) are “regulatory bodies that can influence channels to behave in certain 
ways (patterns) again and again (regeneration)” (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002, 
82), which deal with the pragmatic legitimacy concerns. Normative institutions 
(professions) are “trade associations, professional associations, accreditation 
agencies, or professions themselves that can use social obligation requirements to 
induce and regenerate patterns within channels” (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002, 
82). They are focused on procedural legitimacy requiring the embracement of 
socially accepted norms and behaviors. Cognitive institutions (habitual actions) 
are “culturally supported habits and exert subtle influences on channel behaviors, 
which then tend to be repeated” (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002, 82) and are 
associated with cognitive legitimacy concerns – taken-for-granted cultural 
account.  
 Within institutional environment institutional arrangements are thought to 
be economically efficient. Thus, institutional environment influences institutional 
arrangements, their form and type. The selection of an institutional arrangement – 
an entry mode choice – is among the most important decisions for international 
firms (Root 1994). 
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 This perhaps creates many differences between institutional arrangements 
from distinct environments. For various countries different kinds of regulatory 
institutions may have different impact on institutional arrangements and even 
more on their contractual part. At the same time, some contractual elements might 
be more important in one industry while less important in another. 
 Entry modes 
 E. Anderson and H. Gatignon (1986, 1) state that “the most appropriate 
(most efficient) entry-mode is a function of the tradeoff between control and the 
cost of resource commitment”. They propose that the greater combination of 
country risk and transaction-specificity of assets, the higher degree of control 
should be applied while choosing the entry mode. 
 There is a wide variety of international business arrangements 
classifications. Usually, modes of entry are classified based on the degree of 
control they imply. For the purpose of this research the following types of the 
entry modes are distinguished: 
 Wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) – legally separated company created 
by another company (firm, hierarchy – a high control mode); 
 Joint-venture (JV) – “independent, legally separated company created 
by two or more partners” (Benito 2012). Joint-ventures are usually 
perceived as high-control modes; 
 Contractual entry modes (licensing, franchising etc.) – “an agreement 
creating and defining the obligations between two or more parties” 
(Benito 2012). Contractual entry modes are thought to be a middle-
control modes lying in between equity modes (firm, hierarchy – high 
control modes) and market-based transactions (low control modes); 
 Exporting – “the sale of goods or services to an entity residing in 
another country” (Benito 2012). Exporting is a low-control mode. 
 The institutional environment is believed to influence the potential span of 
entry modes in two ways: formal through laws and regulations and informal 
through local business habits and local corruption levels (Meyer et. al. 2009). 
Ingram and Silverman (2002, 20) state that “institutions directly determine what 
arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy 
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and to create competitive advantage”. Hence, institutions, which exist in the 
foreign market, influence the way a firm chooses to enter. 
 Tighter government regulations may create significant barriers to entry.  A 
lack of property rights, excessive government regulation, corruption, and the 
ineffectiveness of legal system in enforcing contracts hinder economic activity in 
many countries (Kshetri and Dholakia 2011). On the other hand regulatory 
support in the areas of R&D, investments, patents, and labor mobility have 
positive effects (Kshetri and Dholakia 2011). Besides, the institutional issues 
influence both the ownership and entry mode decisions simultaneously. Grewal 
and Dharwadkar (2002) propose that the more attractive of incentives offered by 
the host-country institutional environment, the higher the probability of adoption 
the channel integration level recommended by the institutional environment. 
Based on transaction cost theory, companies should choose entry modes that 
minimize overall transaction costs. 
 Restrictions on foreign ownership 
 Legal restrictions on foreign ownership are regulatory environment 
elements which fully prohibit the establishment of foreign company WOS, limit 
the equity stake which the foreign company can hold, require specific permits for 
WOS establishment etc. Not surprisingly, legal restrictions are among the most 
frequently analyzed factors of the entry mode decision, since formal rules 
determine the possible entry modes alternatives (e.g., with respect to equity 
ownership) and/or they may limit the equity stake, which can be hold by foreign 
investors.  
 Legal restrictions on the foreign ownership are logically expected to 
reduce the likelihood of the WOS establishment (Gomes-Casseres 1990). If host 
country laws force firms to adopt certain entry modes, they can be chosen instead 
of the entry mode, which is preferred based on other theoretical considerations 
(Brouthers 2002). Legal restrictions either reduce the number of choices available 
to companies (Gatignon and Anderson 1988), or create incentives for cooperation 
with local partners. Thus, the effect of legal restrictions is often merely legal or 
economical. 
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 On the other hand, a country’s openness to foreign investment is thought 
to facilitate operations in the market and make full ownership in the country more 
attractive. FDI can be defined as “the control of business activities which take 
place in one country (‘host country’) by a firm based in another country (‘home 
country’)” (Benito 2012) and usually means ownership over at least 10% equity 
stake in a company. Thus, openness to FDI can be seen as another type of foreign 
ownership regulations in the host-country. Morschett, Schramm-Klein, and 
Swoboda (2010) have found that results regarding openness to FDI are 
inconclusive (based on 3 studies). Thus, the hypothesis that “a host country’s 
openness to FDI is positively associated with wholly owned subsidiaries rather 
than cooperative modes of entry” has not been supported. 
 Brouthers (2002) have found support for the hypothesis that “firms 
entering countries with few legal restrictions on mode of entry tend to use wholly-
owned modes while firms entering countries with many legal restrictions on mode 
of entry tend to use joint venture modes”. He has also found that companies tend 
to use wholly-owned modes when perceived transaction costs are high and 
investment risk is low, but they prefer joint venture modes when the transaction 
costs are low and investment risk is high.  
H1a. Restrictions on foreign ownership decrease the probability of wholly-owned 
subsidiary as an entry mode choice. 
 Gatignon and Anderson (1988) have also found empirical support for their 
hypothesis about choice of joint ventures as an entry mode when the host country 
legally restricts foreign ownership. Ahmeda et al. (2002) argue that the existing 
restrictions on foreign ownership can force companies to use joint ventures and/or 
licensing agreements. This prevents the company’s foreign operations integration. 
Studying foreign investment practices, Stopford and Wells (1972) observed that 
companies more often use joint venture and licensing in countries with foreign 
ownership restrictions.  
H1b. Restrictions on foreign ownership increase the probability of joint venture 
as an entry mode choice. 
 The meta-analysis conducted by Morschett, Schramm-Klein, and Swoboda 
(2010) confirms that restrictions are a negative antecedent for the choice of a 
wholly-owned subsidiary and are positively associated with cooperative entry 
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modes. These results consider both the situation when the wholly-owned 
subsidiary is fully prohibited and the situation when other restrictive measures 
(i.e., requirements for specific permission for WOS) exist and are very consistent. 
Even though, Svendsen and Haugland (2011) have found support for the 
hypothesis that state influences in the export market on the one hand and formal 
contracting and relational norms on the other are negatively related. The 
restrictive regulations in the host country against foreign ownership change the 
companies’ preferences towards cooperative modes of entry.  
H1c. Restrictions on foreign ownership increase the probability of using 
contractual entry modes. 
H1d. Restrictions on foreign ownership increase the probability of exporting as 
an entry mode choice. 
Contract enforcement 
  Contract enforcement is another important legal factor when it comes to 
international institutional arrangements. Contracts enforceability measures “the 
efficiency of the judicial system in resolving a commercial dispute” (Doing 
Business 2012a). 
 Zhou and Poppo (2010) have investigated the role of legal enforceability 
with regard to contract explicitness. They have supported the hypotheses about 
contract explicitness which state that when the perceived legal enforceability is 
higher: 
1) the relationship between asset specificity and contract explicitness is 
stronger;  
2) the relationship between environmental uncertainty and contract 
explicitness is stronger;  
3) the relationship between behavioral uncertainty and contract explicitness is 
stronger. 
 They haven’t found support for the assumption about weaker effect of 
relational reliability on contract explicitness when perceived legal enforceability is 
higher. However, they still have found that “the effect of contract explicitness on 
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relational reliability is weaker when perceived legal enforceability is high rather 
than low” but the effect is not significant.  
 Monitoring and enforcing the contracts are among the factors that affect 
transaction costs when dealing with foreign partners. Brouthers and Nakos (2004) 
state, that the ability to enforce contracts characterizes environmental uncertainty 
of the host country together with ability to control other political and legal risks. 
Henisz (2000) has investigated the influence of contractual and political hazards. 
He has found that the probability of a majority-owned plant as an entry mode 
increases in the level of independent contractual hazards and decreases in the level 
independent political hazards. Also, “the probability of choosing a majority-
owned plant as a market entry mode is magnified in the presence of political 
hazards” (Henisz 2000). 
 Companies are sensitive to contractual risk-related attributes, such as 
contract enforceability (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992). Majocchi, Mayrhofer, 
and Camps (2010) have found support for the hypothesis that the lower the 
efficiency of contract enforcement, the more likely the company will choose joint 
ventures rather than non-equity-alliances. The same is applicable to the higher 
political hazard in a country. 
H2a. Contract enforceability decreases the probability of wholly-owned 
subsidiary as an entry mode choice. 
H2b. Contract enforceability decreases the probability of joint venture as an entry 
mode choice. 
 Baena (2012) studying the Spanish franchisors operating in the Middle 
East has come to conclusion that the efficiency of contract enforcement is among 
the most important host country factors. Eﬃciency of contract enforcement is 
especially important for franchisors, licensors, and other contractor, because their 
brand names, patents, and trademarks that can be misused by opportunistic foreign 
partner. Logically, contract enforceability makes the contractual entry modes 
easier and safer. 
H2c. Contract enforceability increases the probability of using contractual entry 
modes. 
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H2d. Contract enforceability increases the probability of exporting as an entry 
mode choice. 
Investor protection 
 Investor protection can be also seen as an important legal factor when it 
comes to international institutional arrangements. It indicates how much the 
investors are protected against such issues as directors’ misuse of corporate assets 
for personal gain or self-dealing, for example (Doing Business 2012b). Investor 
protection plays an important role when it comes to different types of entry modes 
(Neto, Brandão, and Cerqueira 2008).  
 For example, Rossi and Volpin (2004) have found that companies, which 
come from countries with weaker investor protection, are more likely to be 
acquired than similar companies from countries with stronger investor protection, 
while the acquiring companies are more likely to be from countries with relatively 
stronger investor protection. Neto, Brandão, and Cerqueira (2008) have found that 
investor protection seems to influence only mergers and acquisitions and do not 
have influence on other FDI and greenfield investments. Overall, it is logical to 
assume that investor protection has a positive influence on the choice of equity-
based entry modes and negative influence on the choice of cooperative modes of 
entry. 
H3a. Investor protection increases the probability of wholly-owned subsidiary as 
an entry mode choice. 
H3b. Investor protection increases the probability of joint venture as an entry 
mode choice. 
H3c. Investor protection decreases the probability of using contractual entry 
modes. 
H3d. Investor protection decreases the probability of exporting as an entry mode 
choice. 
International trade and protectionism 
 Legal regulations of the international trade and protectionist policies 
characterize the openness of the host country to imports and can be seen as 
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restrictions for the exporting entry modes. Trade barriers restricting the entrance 
via exports force companies to look for other entry modes.  
 The experience gained via prior exports can motivate the company to 
establish a wholly-owned subsidiary (Singh and Kogut 1989). International 
companies are more confident in successful entrance in a market if they or similar 
foreign firms have achieved some success selling products in the host country. 
According to Morschett, Schramm-Klein, and Swoboda’s meta-analysis (2010), 
trade barriers don’t have a significant influence on the entry mode choice based on 
the available data (3 studies).  Tariff barriers are commonly named among the 
market barriers that make the access to the foreign market more difficult (Koch 
2001). Generally, it seems logical that the protectionism is negatively related to 
exporting, while it might positively influence the other possible entry mode 
choices. 
H4a. Protectionism increases the probability of wholly-owned subsidiary as an 
entry mode choice. 
H4b. Protectionism increases the probability of joint venture as an entry mode 
choice. 
H4c. Protectionism increases the probability of using contractual entry modes. 
H4d. Protectionism decreases the probability of exporting as an entry mode 
choice. 
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Proposed Methodology and Data Collection 
 To answer the research question the further presented methodology will be 
used. 
Methodology 
 The previously discussed hypotheses can be tested using the following 
simplified model: 
 
 The model includes two types of variables, which present different type of 
information: 
1) Dependent variables which characterize the different type of the entry 
mode (wholly-owned subsidiary, joint-venture, contractual entry mode, 
exporting) and can be seen as company (microeconomic) information; 
2) Independent variables which characterize the different elements of the 
host-country regulatory environment (restrictions on foreign ownership, 
contract enforceability, investor protection, international trade and 
protectionism) and can be seen as country (macroeconomic) information. 
The entry mode choice is influenced by a variety of factors and not only 
by factors that characterize the host country legal environment. This variety of 
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factors also consists of country- and company-level factors. To control for their 
influences the following control variables with regard to both company and 
country factors will be used:  
 At the company level: profitability, general entry mode strategy; 
 At the country level: the economic growth, corruption. 
Data collection 
 Since the data needed for this research is two types, it will be collected in 
different ways. 
 Macro-level – country – data will be collected from the secondary sources 
using the databases of different international organizations. The macroeconomic 
data for the regulatory institutional environment factors (restrictions on foreign 
ownership, contract enforceability, investor protection, international trade and 
protectionism) will be collected from Doing Business Ranking conducted by the 
International Financial Organization (World Bank Group). The needed 
macroeconomic data for control variables will be acquired from different sources. 
World Bank Data information about economic growth and Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index as a measure of corruption will be 
used. 
 Micro-level – company – data will be collected directly from companies 
through the survey. If needed, additional information from annual reports will be 
used.  
 The target for the sampling is the international firms ideally operating in 
different markets and using various entry modes among them. The sample will be 
built of Ukrainian and Norwegian companies. The non-probability convenience 
sampling will be used in this study. The potential respondents will be found 
through acquaintances, colleagues, and professors etc., using their personal and 
professional networks. So, companies will be mainly approached through personal 
contacts. 
 Since the sample size should be big enough to provide significant 
conclusions, the sample size is expected to be at least 80-120 companies’ cases. In 
order to avoid lack of data we will try to reach as many respondents as possible. 
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 The questionnaire will have a plain structure and will be divided into two 
parts. The first part will include questions about general company information: 
capital, size, ownership, HQ, year of foundation. In the second part the 
participants will be asked to provide information about their entry strategies: they 
will be asked to name 1-5 foreign markets where they still operate, entry modes 
applied there while first entering, year of entrance to those markets, and if the 
entry mode has been changed to another operation mode.  
 To avoid rejections the questionnaire will be designed so that it minimizes 
cost and time required to answer it. Also, the social exchange theory will be 
applied (Dilman 2006). It will be mentioned that the research looks into the areas 
which have obtained little attention and have provided contradicting conclusions, 
and, thus, the further research is needed. The respondents will be able to receive 
the research results when it will be completed.  
 Since the questionnaire will be developed in English, it will be translated, 
if needed, into Ukrainian and Norwegian languages and then back translated in 
order to provide correct questionnaire presentation. 
 The answers will be collected in a special database and later aligned with 
macroeconomic information about specific countries. 
Validity and reliability 
 When it comes to drawing conclusions from proposed research model, 
they should be both valid and reliable.  
 Cook and Campbell (1979) have identified four types of validity. First of 
them is statistical conclusion validity which refers to the appropriate use of 
statistics and helps to answer the question about relationships existence between 
variables. In current research it will be gained through correct usage of statistical 
methods. A covariance-correlation analysis will be done to check if the assumed 
relationships exist. To analyze the collected data the logistic regressions will be 
run in SPSS. The statistical significance of the gained results and explanatory 
power of the model will be taken in the account while drawing conclusions.  
 Since the existing research states that the institutional environment 
influence institutional arrangement, the relationship between regulatory 
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institutional environment in the host-country and the chosen entry mode can be 
seen as causal. Thus, when it comes to the second type of validity – internal 
validity, the current study is seen as valid.   
 To assess the third type of validity – construct validity, convergent and 
discriminant validity will be assessed based on the conducted data analysis. 
Convergent validity means that constructs that are theoretically related are related 
in the reality, while discriminant validity works in the same way when it comes to 
concepts that are not theoretically related (Research Methods Knowledge Base 
2006a). Thus, the conclusion about construct validity will be based on the made 
covariance-correlation analysis. 
 The fourth type of validity – external validity – is the most important, 
because it involves generalizations (Research Methods Knowledge Base 2006b). 
Thus, since the sample is drawn from the population of the international 
companies, the results can be automatically generalized for this population. Also, 
the proximal similarity model suggested by Donald T. Campbell can be applied 
(Research Methods Knowledge Base 2006b). It will let to build a special 
generalizing model, which implies different contexts (different combinations of 
regulatory environment factors), so that it will be possible to generalize the 
findings to similar cases. 
 The reliability of the model will be estimated through the different types of 
measurement error checking, since it deals with the quality of measurement 
(Research Methods Knowledge Base 2006c). The results will be integrated with 
the validity measurement. 
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Miscellaneous 
 The current research is conducted as a Master thesis which is a part of 
Master of Science in International Management Program and is planned to be 
finished within the deadline on the 1
st
 of September 2013. Through the thesis 
progress some parts of the study might be reviewed and adjusted.  
 The further research progress and the plan for data collection and analysis 
can be divided into three stages. First of all, the questionnaire for the company-
level data collection will be built and tested. This part of the study is planned to be 
finished at the end of February 2013. 
 The second stage of research progress includes the distribution of the 
questionnaire among companies and data collection from them. At the same time 
the needed data from the secondary sources will be assessed. Based on the 
acquired information the data set for the further analysis will be created. This part 
of the study is planned to be done in March and April and to be finished before 
May. 
 The third, and the last, stage of the thesis writing consists mainly of the 
data analysis. The results of the conducted analysis will be discussed and 
interpreted with regard to previously done literature review and developed 
hypotheses. Based on that discussion the conclusions, empirical implications, and 
propositions for further research will be drawn. This part of the research will be 
finished until the deadline for the Master thesis. 
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